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Special Reports

Tax, Trade, and Harmful
Tax Competition:
Reflections on the FSC
Controversy
by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is a professor of law at the
Michigan Law School.

T

he current controversy over
foreign sales corporations
(FSCs) provides a good opportunity to address the broader question of the proper relationship
between the international income
tax regime and the WTO. In particular, can one identifY aspects of
international taxation that are
subject to the jurisdiction of the
WTO, as reflected in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)? This article will argue
that there are certain aspects of
current international income tax
practice that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the WTO. In particular, many of the regimes identified by the OECD as constituting
harmful tax competition should
also be considered export subsidies
under article XVI of the GATT,
and, therefore, as being subject to
challenge under WTO procedures,
just as the FSCs were challenged
bytheEU.
The article is divided into three
parts. Part I is a general description of those parts of the GATT
that relate to taxation. Part II
addresses the application of GATT
rules to three types of tax havens,
which I have elsewhere named
"traditional tax havens," "production tax havens," and ''headquarters tax havens."1 The first type
are the offshore tax havens, while
the other two are what the OECD
calls "preferential tax regimes" in
otherwise high-tax countries. Part
Tax Notes International

II concludes that most production
tax havens, and some traditional
and headquarters tax havens,
constitute export subsidies under
the GATT. Finally,· Part III asks
whether harmful tax competition
is better addressed by the WTO or
by organizations with less binding
adjudicatory power, such as the
OECD. It concludes that, while in
the short term the OECD has the
advantage, the WTO may provide
a better forum in the longer term.

tion procedures in the case of any
"subsidy ... which operates
directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to
reduce imports of any product into,
[a contracting party's] territory."5
In addition, the article expressly
prohibits the use of any subsidy
"on the export of any product ...
which subsidy results in the sale of
such product for export at a price
lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to
buyers in the domestic market."6 A
note clarifies that the exemption of
an exported product from taxes
borne by the like product when
destined for domestic consumption
(such as zero rating exports for
VAT) "shall not be deemed to be a
subsidy."7
Article XVI was significantly
expanded by the Subsidies Code
included in the 1994 version of the
GATT. 8 The Subsidies Code defines
"subsidy'' as including cases where
"government revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not
collected."9 To be actionable under
the GATT, a subsidy must be
"specific to an enterprise or

I. The GATT and Taxes
There are two articles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade that bear directly on
taxation. 2 Article III of the GATT
provides that "internal taxes ...
should not be applied to imported
or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production."3
Because of the reference to
products, this provision has
generally been understood as
referring only to indirect taxes (i.e.,
excise taxes or consumption taxes
such as the VAT). However, even if
the article is interpreted as
referring to direct taxes as well, it
seems unlikely that the income
tax, in particular, can be used as
an instrument for protecting
domestic production because of the
difficulty of designing income tax
provisions that will apply only to
foreign production. 4
Article XVI of the GATT
provides, in general, for notifica-

1

See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
"Globalization, Tax Competition, and the
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State," 113
Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000).
2
The 1994 version of the GATT is part
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, reached at
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations (April1994). GATT
Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
- The Legal Texts (Geneva, 1994) (henceforward GATT), i.
3

GATT, 490.
See Joel Slemrod, Free Trade and
Protectionist Taxation, NBER Research
Working Paper 4902 (1994) (while theoretically it is possible to design tax rules that
have the same effect as tariffs, in practice
this is difficult to achieve).
5
GATT, 508.
6
GATT, 509. The FSC regime was
struck down under this provision.
7
GATT, 549.
8
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT 264.
9
GATT, 264.
4
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industry or group of enterprises or
industries."10 In addition, a specific
subsidy is prohibited only if it is
"contingent, in law or in fact ...
upon export performance" or ''upon
the use of domestic over imported
goods."11 Annex I to the Subsidies
Code includes an "illustrative list
of export subsidies" which includes
"[t]he full or partial exemption
remission, or deferral specifically
related to exports of direct
taxes ... paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises."12
However, a footnote clarifies that
this language "is not intended to
limit a Member from taking
measures to avoid the double
taxation of foreign source income
earned by its enterprises."13
The other agreement included
in the 1994 version of the GATT
that bears on taxation is the
General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). Because services
frequently involve FDI, in this case
the line between trade and investment is particularly blurred.
Therefore, the United States
inserted provisions in the GATS
that prevent it from overriding
domestic tax legislation and
income tax treaties applicable to
FDI. In particular, the provision of
national treatment for service
providers can be avoided if "the
difference in treatment is aimed at
ensuring the equitable and
effective imposition or collection of
direct taxes."14 In addition, most
favored nation (MFN) treatment
can be avoided if the difference in
treatment follows from a tax
treaty. 15

II. Application of GATT
Rules to Tax Havens
In previous work, I have identified three types of tax havens: (a)
"production tax havens," in which
there is a specific tax holiday or
other type of tax benefit designed
to attract foreign investors to set
up production facilities in a host
country; (b) "traditional tax
havens," i.e., jurisdictions with
little or no income tax that seek to
attract foreign investors and
financial service providers through
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the promise of no taxation and
bank secrecy; and (c) "headquarters tax havens," i.e., regimes
designed to attract multinational
enterprises to locate their headquarters in a jurisdiction by
promising no taxation (or no
current taxation) of income derived
from foreign subsidiaries.16
How do the GATT rules previously described apply to these
three types of tax haven? The
clearest application is in the case
of production tax havens. These
regimes are generally "ring

It would seem that such production tax havens constitute
prohibited export subsidies under
the GATT. They generally involve
foregone revenue (i.e., are tax
expenditures), are specific to
certain taxpayers (in fact they are
frequently negotiated deals), and
are "in fact" contingent on export
performance, because the products
or services they involve cannot be
targeted at the domestic market.
The case of traditional tax
havens is harder. Since there is no
income tax, they do not involve
"foregone revenue" or a tax expenditure in the traditional sense.
However, traditional tax havens
frequently grant exemptions to the
offshore sector from those taxes
that they do collect (e.g., VAT).
Moreover, they frequently involve
not just pure investments (which
are presumably not covered by the
current GATT) but, in particular,
the provision of financial services,
such as brokerage or insurance,
targeted entirely at foreigners (and
frequently ring fenced as well).
Thus, arguably, traditional tax
havens, or at least that part of
their activities that is more than

10GATT, 265.
11

GATT, 266.

12GATT, 305. The list also includes a
fenced," i.e., they are designed to
foster exports and, therefore, are
separated from the domestic
economy (and sometimes also not
available to domestic investors).
The regimes are ring fenced
precisely because they are set up
by countries with a real domestic
tax base that do not wish to see
that base eroded by the tax concessions granted within the preferential regimes. The EU and OECD
reports on harmful tax competition
cite dozens of such regimes, even
though they limit themselves only
to regimes of member countries
and (in the case of the OECD)
exclude "real" investments (i.e.,
manufacturing) .17

provision for exemption or remission of
indirect taxes in excess of those levied on
products for domestic consumption, and
defines direct and indirect taxes to include
income tax and VAT, respectively. GATT,
305 n. 58. Deferral is allowed if accompanied by an interest charge. Ibid.

13 GATT, 305 n. 59.
14GATT, 339-340.
15GATT, 340; see also GATT, 346 (no
arbitration in the case of existing tax treaties).

16For further elaboration, see Aviy onah, Globalization, supra.

17See "OECD Releases Tax Haven
Blacklist," Tax Notes Int'l, July 3, 2000, p.
7, or 2000 WTD 124-10, or Doc 2000-17611
(3 original pages); "Primarolo Group's
Report Identifies 66 Harmful Tax
Regimes," Tax Notes Int'l, Mar. 20, 2000,
p. 1283, or 2000 WTD 50-1, or Doc
2000-7548 (8 original pages).
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pure passive investment, fall
within the prohibition on export
subsidies as well. Moreover, since
they are generally not party to tax
treaties, the exclusion of treaty
matters from GATS does not cover
them.
The toughest cases are headquarters tax havens. This covers
specific regimes designed to attract
foreign multinational enterprises
(MNEs), which are akin to production tax havens. Those are presumably export subsidies for the
reasons stated above. However,
they also cover things like the U.S.
deferral regime and the European
exemption for foreign source
income of domestic MNEs. Are
these export subsidies under the
GATT? If the only activity involved
is pure investment (e.g., the acquisition of a foreign target), then the
regime is not covered. But usually
there is also the provision of
services and/or transfer of intangibles, and frequently also the sale of
goods to the foreign subsidiaries.
In these cases there is trade, and
the provision could be an export
subsidy.
The ultimate question in this
regard is whether deferral or
exemption is a tax expenditure,
because foregone revenue is a
precondition to finding a subsidy
under the GATT. In a worldwide
regime such as the United States,
the answer is clearly yes (and
deferral is in the tax expenditure
budget). What about an exemption
regime? 18 The Europeans have
argued that the exemption of
foreign source income in Europe is
part of the normative baseline. But
defining the baseline for the
European regimes is hard, since
they contain many worldwide
features (such as CFC regimes).
Thus, I think that it is possible to
argue that there is "foregone
revenue" here as well, even if it is
not reflected in the tax expenditure budget.
But what about the footnote
that specifically excludes regimes
designed to avoid double taxation?
While the intent of this footnote
was to exclude the European
Tax Notes International

regimes, query whether an
exemption regime that does not
take into account whether the
income was subject to tax at source
qualifies as a "measure to avoid
double taxation." Fundamentally, a
general exemption regime distinguishes between domestic and
foreign source activities in a way
that frequently subsidizes exports,
not just investments, and,

In the short run, the
OECD is clearly the
superior forum to
address the problem of
harmful tax competition
because of the progress
it has already made on
this issue.

therefore, can be construed as an
export subsidy if the income is not
taxed at source. 19

III. Should Harmful Tax
Competition Be Addressed
Through the WTO?
I have argued elsewhere that
the problem of harmful tax competition cannot be adequately
addressed by the current international tax regime based on
bilateral treaties. 20 A multilateral
effort clearly is needed, and the
question is whether the proper
forum for it is the WTO or an organization such as the OECD, with a
more restricted membership and
fewer adjudicatory powers.
The OECD is clearly the
superior forum in the short run

because of the progress it has
already made on the issue.
However, in the long run, relying
on the OECD to restrict harmful
tax competition suffers from three
significant drawbacks. First, the
OECD only has 29 members, and
it is not clear that it can effectively
enforce its anti-tax competition
rules on non-member countries. 21
For example, solutions that rely on
where the parents of MNEs are
located assume that no significant
growth in MNEs will take place
outside the OECD, and solutions
that rely on the OECD as the
market assume no significant
markets outside the OECD. Either
assumption may become wrong,
and when that happens solutions
that rely on OECD enforcement
will lose their effectiveness unless
those emerging markets were to
join the OECD. While several
developing countries have joined
the OECD recently (e.g., South
Korea and Mexico), it is hard to
imagine China or India doing so in
the near future.
Second, relying on the OECD to
implement solutions to the
harmful tax competition problem,
even if those solutions are tailored
to benefit developing countries,
may not be acceptable to those
countries. Even though the OECD
has made a huge effort to include
non-OECD members in the tax

18
That is why the new U.S. exclusion
for "qualifYing foreign trade income" (new
code section 114) seems unlikely to pass
WTO muster, since it operates in the
context of a worldwide tax regime.
19

Note, however, that the FSC report
does seem to approve of "territorial tax
systems." But this is dicta; if the case ever
came before the WTO, the U.S. seems to
have a stronger argument for complaining
about the European exemption systems
than most tax experts assume.
20

See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra.

21

The EU effort is even more limited in
scope, and has run into significant problems because of this, as the recent developments on taxation of savings make clear
(the U.K. and Luxembourg will cooperate
only if Switzerland and the U.S. do).
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competition project, it is still identified as the rich countries' club.
Thus, it is hard to believe that
developing countries will be able to
shed their suspicions that the
OECD will not act in their
interests even if it actually does so.
Third, the OECD effort is
limited so far to geographically
mobile financial services, and
excludes real investments,
although these constitute a significant part of the problem. In
addition, even for the areas it does
cover, the OECD has only the
power to persuade, not to adjudicate.

and insures that players have an
incentive to cooperate. 24 In an
assurance (stag hunt) game, both
players cooperate if they can be
assured of the other player's cooperation.25 In the first case, an organizational setting is needed to
manage retaliatory strategies
while, in the second, it is needed to
provide the information required
for the assurance to exist.
However, in the context of tax
competition, it would seem that
both retaliation and lack of infor-

From these perspectives, the

wro is a more attractive

candidate for "world tax organization." It has a much broader
membership than the OECD, and
developing countries are much
better represented (and have real
clout, as shown by the recent
struggle over choosing the Director
General of the wro, as well as by
events at Seattle). Moreover, as
indicated above, the wro rules
already cover and prohibit most
forms of harmful tax competition
identified by the OECD.
But there are several serious
objections to including tax matters
in the jurisdiction of the wro.
First, it has been argued that the
wro lacks sufficient tax
expertise. 22 However, that problem
can be remedied by hiring a sufficient number of tax experts to sit
on the WfO's panels. In fact, as
the wro has expanded its jurisdiction to non-tariff matters, its
staff already includes tax experts
who also understand trade issues.
Robert Green has advanced a
more serious objection, arguing
that the costs of imposing the
WfO's legalistic dispute-resolution
mechanism outweigh any
benefits. 23 Green argues that the
need for the wro to resolve trade
disputes legalistically is based on
two features that are typically
lacking in the tax context: retaliation and lack of transparency.
Retaliation is a feature of repeated
prisoners' dilemma-type games

2844 • 18 December 2000

ments are characterized as prisoners' dilemma or assurance games,
they seem to present precisely the
kind of problem that only a multilateral organization with
rule-making power can effectively
resolve. 26
However, Green also raises
another objection to giving the
wro authority over taxes which,
in practice, is likely to be far more
potent: the problem of sovereignty.
Countries are wary of giving up
their sovereignty over tax matters,
which lies at the heart of their
ability to exercise national power.
This concern is particularly acute
in the U.S. and almost led to the
failure of the entire Uruguay
Round as the U.S. insisted, at the
last minute, on excluding direct
taxes from the purview of the
GATS. 27 Green argues that if the
wro dispute resolution
mechanism were given authority
over tax issues, this may lead to
widespread noncompliance, espe-

22
See Robert E. Hudec, ''Reforming
GATT Adjudication Procedures: The
Lessons of the DISC Case," 72 Minn. L.
Rev. 1443 (1988); William M. Considine,
'The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation," 7
N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 217 (1974).

mation are serious problems. For
example, in the case of portfolio
investment the U.S. began a race
to the bottom by abolishing its
withholding tax, and other
countries responded (i.e., retaliated) by abolishing their own
taxes. In the current situation, no
country dare re-impose its tax
without adequate assurance that
other countries will follow.
Similarly, for direct investment,
countries have adopted tax incentives or have adopted deferral and
exemption rules for their resident
MNEs in response to the actions of
other countries and fear of
changing such policies without
assurance that others will follow
suit. Thus, whether these develop-

23See Robert M. Green, "Antilegalistic
Approaches to Resolving Disputes
Between Governments: A Comparison of
the International Tax and Trade Regimes,"
23 Yale lnt'l L. J. 79 (1998).
24
See id.; see also Robert Axelrod, The
Evolution of Cooperation (1984).

25The assurance game has a payoff
structure in which the best outcome is if
both countries cooperate, while in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is if you
defect and the other side cooperates. See
"Antilegalistic Approaches," supra.
26The race to the bottom in international taxation in the 1980s resembled a prisoners' dilemma, in which one country (the
U.S.) preferred to defect while others cooperate in order to draw investment to it.
But the current situation is more like an
assurance game, in which the U.S. and
other OECD members would prefer cooperation above all other outcomes.
27See "Antilegalistic Approaches,"
supra.
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cially given the perception that the
WTO is non-transparent and that
it lacks democratic legitimacy. 2s
Green may be wrong about this
estimate, especially since the
analysis above has shown that the
WTO already has jurisdiction on
most forms of harmful tax competition, so that further extension of its
powers would be unnecessary. But
even if Green is right and sovereignty poses a real problem, there
may be a solution to this as well.
Under the GA'IT regime, all
decisions had to be reached by
consensus, i.e., with the agreement
of the party whose regime is at
stake. Under the WTO rules, on the
other hand, all dispute settlement
rulings are binding unless there is
a consensus not to implement them,
i.e., when even the complaining
party agrees to refrain from action.
Perhaps the former rule is more
appropriate for tax matters than
the latter, because it gives the loser
a veto if it feels that its sovereignty
is truly at stake. Similar rules exist
for tax matters in both the EU and
the OECD. But, as the DISC case in
the GA'IT and the adoption of the
tax competition report by the
OECD show, a country will
typically reserve its veto power only

to those cases in which the adverse
result is truly perceived as a severe
limit on its sovereignty. In other
cases, the stigma of disapproval is
sufficient to ensure cooperation.

IV. Conclusion
The OECD's effort to combat
harmful tax competition has so far
been a remarkable success,
achieving much more progress in a
short time frame than most
observers would have predicted
when it started in 1998. However,
the hard part is yet to be tackled:
will countries actually give up
their preferential tax regimes
under the timetable devised by the
OECD? In addition, the OECD has
not yet addressed the problem of
preferential regimes for real
investments, and it is unclear
whether it can achieve progress on
preferential regimes in
non-member countries.
From this perspective, I believe
that it is helpful and not harmful
to the OECD effort (which I wholeheartedly support) to point out
that most of the preferential tax
regimes identified by the OECD
may also be export subsidies, and
therefore subject to attack under
current WTO rules. The prospect

of repeating the FSC struggle over
and over again on a worldwide
basis may indeed be a powerful
impetus for inducing both member
and non-member countries to
cooperate with the less coercive
and less costly OECD effort. But
should the OECD effort fail, then
serious consideration should be
given to pursuing the goal of
limiting harmful tax competition
through the WTO, in the ways
+
outlined above.2 9

28
See id.; see also Joel P. Trachtman,
"The Domain ofWTO Dispute Resolution,"
40 Harv. Int'l L. J. 333 (1999) (describing
factors to be weighed in choosing between
rules and standards in the WTO context).
But it should be noted that the WTO
already has exercised jurisdiction over
matters such as food safety, intellectual
property, and similar issues that also
involve sensitive sovereignty issues.
29
0f course, this assumes that some
forms of tax competition should be limited.
For the normative argument as to why
they should, as well as an attempt to
distinguish, on a principled basis, harmful
from beneficial tax competition, see
Avi-Yonah, supra.
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